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For obvious reasons, I am in broad agreement with this paper. If we reason well, we 
do not guarantee that we will arrive at true beliefs; however, we are very likely to 
reason from those beliefs we have to better beliefs. I would understand the notion of 
maximum participation in terms of not preventing some particular group from 
participating in public deliberation and encouraging more groups to participate. As 
has been said, we have mediated beliefs, which is to say that many of our beliefs 
come from other people, and we should engage in assessing such beliefs when 
appropriate. This does not mean being individualists in epistemology since, after all, 
much of what we are assessing comes from others and many of the tools we use to 
assess it are socially acquired.  
In employing and improving skills of argumentation, we need to be aware 
that there are points of view other than our own, and we should be willing to reason 
and deliberate about such views. Differences in society can serve the purpose of 
exposing problematic reasoning, leading to improvements in methods of inquiry 
and the conclusions reached after public deliberation. I agree that, as individuals or 
as a society, we can benefit from discussion even in cases where a dispute is not 
resolved. We can better understand positions and may even in some cases better 
understand ourselves. 
I find some awkward expressions in this paper, and some obscure ones 
including “ontologizing one’s beliefs” and “rejecting the essentialist qualities of 
arguments”. I also noted a few problems of wording and found some important 
themes that could have been further developed. To me at least four were prominent; 
the suggestion that we think of better or worse beliefs rather than true or false ones; 
the idea that lines of reasoning might be acceptable in some contexts though not in 
others; the relation between theory and practice; and the ways in which ignorance 
contributes to intolerance. But obviously no one conference paper could treat all 
these interesting topics.  
In developing her account, Laura Benacquista kindly refers to several of my 
own papers in a 1999 book, The Philosophy of Argument. For these references I am 
grateful, but I would make a couple of comments about details. My statement that 
democracies deal with disagreements was not intended to give a definition of what 
democracy is or what “democracy” means, but rather to say that one of the things 
democracies in fact have to do is deal with uncertainties. And given her attention to 
my work, I find it strange that she does not refer to my reflections on adversariality 
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as expressed there. In several essays I seek an account that accommodates and 
values objections and criticism but rejects adversariality in any sense incorporating 
hostility. I distinguish between differences of opinion and conflicts between people 
expressing their opinions and advocate non-confrontational styles in arguing.  
 But given that these are not points of general interest, I will turn my 
attention elsewhere. Benacquista allows that there are limits to tolerance, but does 
not develop that important point. She says (page 9) “suppressed viewpoints should 
be heard.” It is this claim that I wish to explore further here. Her view is not quite 
clear because the statement appears in an unquantified form. That fact poses the 
question of whether she intends to say that all suppressed viewpoints should be 
heard, or that most, or many, or some suppressed viewpoints should be heard. “All” 
is the interpretation that I think most likely and that I will explore here by 
considering the recent Canadian case of political commentator and University of 
Calgary professor Tom Flanagan.  
 On February 27, 2013 Flanagan was speaking to a group at the University of 
Lethbridge, concerning Canada’s Indian Act. Many members of the audience were 
First Nations people unsympathetic to his opinions and the discussion had been 
lively to say the least. A man raised a question about an entirely different topic: that 
of pornography. In response to that question Flanagan said, “I certainly have no 
sympathy for child molesters, but I do have grave doubts about putting people in jail 
because of their taste in pictures.” He added that the viewers of child pornography 
do not themselves harm anyone.  
 There was an outcry both at the meeting and outside it. The comment was 
widely publicized and rejected as beyond the pale. The CBC program “Power and 
Politics” severed contact with Flanagan. University of Calgary president Elizabeth 
Cannon implied disaffiliation by announcing in the press Flanagan’s imminent 
retirement from the university: June 30, 2013. Alberta’s Wildrose Party president 
Danielle Smith send Flanagan would no longer serve as an advisor to her party. 
Alberta Premier Alison Redford similarly rejected the remark. Canadian prime 
minister Stephen Harper, whose teacher and mentor Flanagan had been, firmly 
denounce it and forswore further associations with Flanagan. Flanagan’s speaking 
engagement at the prestigious Manning Centre was cancelled. In short, this man’s 
influential roles as a media personality, right-wing public intellectual, advisor, and 
professor were terminated. Apparently his reputation was ruined by his comments. 
Michael Enright, writing about the case, said luridly, “Professor Flanagan fell 
everlastingly into a fire pit deeper than a Florida sinkhole”. Then, using a different 
metaphor, he said that Flanagan had become “academic road-kill.” As this language 
might suggest, Enright thought the reaction was overblown. Though not at all 
supportive of Flanagan’s views on child pornography or on libertarianism 
philosophy more generally, Enright argued that a university professor should be 
able to raise uncomfortable questions. He stated that we do not have freedom of 
expression to protect the views we accept but rather to protect those that we do not 
accept. We should note at this point that the issue here is not a legal one. 
Repercussions were social and economic, not legal. As it stands, the case does not 
raise legal issues. 
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Very many things can be said and have been said about this case. One 
commentator noted that Flanagan had done worse when, on public television, he 
called for the assassination of Julian Assange, founder of Wikileaks. Flanagan was 
surely wrong in supposing that no one is harmed when people looking at pictures of 
child pornography. Real children are used, and very seriously abused, to make such 
pictures. That was a stupid mistake. Do people who make stupid mistakes deserve 
such immediate social repercussions? Do they deserve them if they are university 
professors? If they are public figures? If they are university professors who are also 
public figures? To defend the abuse of children would be outrageous, but in making 
his ‘stupid mistake, which we could more charitably describe as an unwise remark, 
Flanagan was not doing that. One might infer that he was doing that, or was even a 
viewer of child pornography himself, but that would be hasty and unwarranted. 
Flanagan later stated (National Post March 4, 2013) that he had meant to 
raise the question of how society should treat persons who were voyeurs, not 
themselves sexual abusers, though such persons might move on to actual abuse. He 
said that he had meant to raise the questions as to whether prison was the best 
treatment for such persons. A University of Toronto law professor, Brenda 
Crossman, cited by Enright, commented that in fact discussion of Canada’s child 
pornography laws was needed, that there was a kind of ‘moral panic’ around the 
issue of child pornography working to cut off public discussion in Canada.  
 Obviously, one could write much about such themes. But I should return to 
Laura Benacquista’s paper at this point. Benacquista said that suppressed 
viewpoints should be heard and I have interpreted this comment to mean that all 
suppressed viewpoints should be heard. Consider now the stance that viewers of 
child pornography only look at pictures. This view is suppressed. Should it be 
heard? It was indeed heard when Tom Flanagan expressed it, but it was only heard 
very briefly and reactions were severe. We are not likely to hear echoes of this view 
expressed publicly in Canada any time soon. In the case of Flanagan, Canadian 
society has not behaved according to a strong norm recommending that all 
suppressed views should be open to discussion. 
But perhaps Laura Benacquista meant instead to claim the more restricted 
view that most suppressed viewpoints should be heard. If so, she would need to 
describe which suppressed views should not be heard. On a more restricted 
interpretation her view can be reconciled with norms against Holocaust denial 
(illegal in some countries) and hate speech and with the general Canadian reaction 
to the Flanagan comments. The pressing issues here are major problems for social 
and political philosophy. They clearly take us far beyond argumentation theory, and 
I say that acknowledging that argumentation theory could nevertheless contribute 
to our understanding of those problems. 
 I make no pretense of resolving such issues. Perhaps Laura Benacquista is 
right, even on a universal interpretation. Perhaps we should not repress discussion 
of highly unpopular (suppressed) views on topics such as child pornography and the 
Holocaust. If so, the Canadian response to Flanagan’s comment was indeed over-
blown and wrong. Or perhaps it is Benacquista who has been overly bold; perhaps 
there are legitimate exceptions to her stated principle, which should hold only 
ceteris paribus and the Flanagan case amounts to an exception establishing that 
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point. A third possibility is that the view holds only ceteris paribus but the Flanagan 
case does not itself constitute an exception. These possibilities merit exploration. 
The themes I would draw from this discussion are two. First of all, some 
unquantified remarks are misleading and require quantification. Secondly, accounts 
in the context of argumentation theory should not aspire to resolve issues in social 
and political philosophy. 
 
 
 
